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The COVID pandemic and China’s response to it have intensified US suspicions and greatly 
strengthened—inside the executive branch, in Congress, in the public—the appetite for a tougher line 
with China. This shift has not abated with the new Presidential administration. 
 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is uniquely positioned to deal with 
China: because CFIUS reviews the impact of certain FDI transactions on US national security, it has the 
power to approve, condition or frustrate Chinese investments into the US.   
 
If not calibrated, however, post-COVID China suspicions may distort CFIUS’s focus to the long-term 
detriment of US national security. Therefore, CFIUS should discipline its risk analysis, find ways to 
improve the clarity of its communications with the private sector and judiciously exercise its powers to 
preserve its long-term institutional ability to carry out its vital national security mission. There are at least 
four ways in which CFIUS should continue to adapt its approach:  
 
 Healthcare data under the microscope. CFIUS has historically been interested in reviewing 
transactions with non-US investors involving US healthcare businesses where the personal 
health information of US citizens might be compromised. Today, CFIUS is enlarging its focus 
to include transactions that may compromise US genomic data. In addition to supporting 
China’s drive to become a global leader in biotech and precision medicine, certain member 
agencies of CFIUS believe that China may use such genomic data—together with previous 
US data exploitations—to target individuals with negative US national security consequences. 
 Supply chain resilience. CFIUS has shown increased interest in reviewing transactions that 
produce or deal in products critical to US supply chains, including especially pharmaceutical 
ingredients, minerals, advanced packaging, high-capacity batteries, and semiconductors. The 
premise of this policy interest is the strategic importance of resilience in an era of intense 
competition with China. But not all of these transactions involve the same risks, or to the same 
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degree. CFIUS should redouble its efforts to make careful fact-specific determinations of the 
risk profile of (i) a given transaction, including with respect to the industry sector, nature of 
the national security vulnerabilities of the US business, and (ii) the prospective foreign buyer. 
 China without illusions. CFIUS is now less inclined to distinguish among different types of 
Chinese buyers (e.g., state-owned enterprises versus private companies) and between 
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong buyers for purposes of its “threat” profile assessments in 
M&A transactions. This is not to say that these distinctions are irrelevant. Rather, these 
distinctions are less salient in the context of a CFIUS review—an approach that may surprise 
business executives who have long used these distinctions to assess other types of legal risk 
(e.g., corruption risks) with respect to Chinese counterparties. Thus, one should expect that 
Chinese (and Hong Kong) private companies and investment funds will receive as much 
scrutiny as Chinese state-owned or affiliated actors. CFIUS should clarify for the private 
sector the basis for these short-form prudential judgements. While full transparency is 
unrealistic, it should be possible for CFIUS to provide clarity to the private sector by tethering 
its policy approach to information that is unclassified and/or already public, but not 
necessarily widely known. For example, the US executive branch could increase transparency 
on its general views on how market players in China operate by reference to China’s own 
official statements in this regard (e.g., Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of 
the Private Economy). This additional clarity would help the private sector better understand 
the likely salience of CFIUS for a contemplated transaction. 
 CFIUS as an enforcer. While CFIUS may compel parties to file with it, CFIUS has 
historically lacked sufficient means to do so, except in the most pressing cases. Today, 
however, CFIUS is better configured and better resourced to “pressure test” its jurisdictional 
authority by reaching out to transaction parties pre- or post-closing with respect to transactions 
that were not notified to it. This is an important tool that the CFIUS’s new office of Monitoring 
& Enforcement should use to strengthen the systemic incentives for parties to comply with 
the CFIUS legal regime. Nevertheless, CFIUS should use this tool judiciously. In cases where 
non-notified transactions have been completed, certain legal rights will have been acquired 
by foreign persons. These rights may provide a legal basis to challenge CFIUS’s authority on 
constitutional and other grounds. While such legal challenges are rare and an uphill battle for 
plaintiffs, any credible threat of colorable litigation puts significant institutional pressure on 
CFIUS. 
As with other crises, COVID has forced US security planners to think about new vectors of risk. 
Given CFIUS’s unique contribution to US security, it should carefully calibrate its risk post-COVID 
framework and resist a reflexive, sweeping approach that could undermine long-term US security 
interests. A more nuanced framework—with clearer communication and a judicious institutional 
posture—will better advance US security interests and may help reduce the policy gap between the 
US and its allies on Chinese investment issues.  
 
* The Honorable Mario Mancuso (mario.mancuso@kirkland.com) is a former US Under Secretary for Industry and 
Security, CFIUS decision-maker and senior Pentagon official; he is currently a Senior Visiting Fellow for International 
Security at the Hudson Institute and a senior partner at a leading international law firm. The analysis of this Perspective 
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draws on, inter alia, Mario Mancuso, A Dealmaker's Guide to CFIUS (2019). The author would like to thank Mark 
Feldman, Chase Kaniecki and Joachim Pohl for their helpful peer reviews. 
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